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A Framework for Assessing
the Rationality of Judgments in
Carcinogenicity Hazard Identification*
Douglas J. Crawford-Brown & Kenneth G. Brown"

Introduction
The hazard identification stage of cancer risk analysis presents an
interesting problem in the interaction between science, philosophy and
the process of decision. This stage is often highly debated since the

process of reasoning is primarily qualitative; the results "trigger" the
other stages of analysis; the mere act of classifying a substance as a
carcinogen is apt to increase public and regulatory pressure for control;

and, with the different fields of science -that must interact, significant
differences in standards of evidence and reasoning can be used.
Regulatory agencies and scientific organizations have attempted to

provide quasi-formal guidelines within which hazard identification for
carcinogens may be performed in a way that recognizes these issues. An

example is the recently released proposal for guidelines on
carcinogenicity assessment from the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA),1 to assist analysts in classifying substances into various
categories of carcinogenicity based on available evidence.

* This research was supported in part by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), Office of Health and Environmental Assessment of ORD. This paper should
not be construed as representing the Agency's views or position.
** Dr. Crawford-Brown is a Professor, Dept. Environmental Sciences
and
Engineering (Public Policy Analysis-Ecology) and Director, Institute for Environmental Studies, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. He holds a B.S. and M.S.
(Theoretical Physics) and PhD (Nuclear Science) - all from the Georgia Institute of
Technology.
Dr. Brown is a private consultant on data analysis for human health risk
assessment in Chapel Hill, NC. He holds a B.A. (Mathematics) Duke University, an
M.A. (Statistics), American University and a PhD (Statistics), Johns Hopkins
University.
1 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen
Risk Assessment; 61 F.R. 17960 (1996).
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Table 1
Categories of Carcinogenicity Claims Used by EPA
Category

Criteriafor Classification in the Category

A

Human Carcinogen
Sufficient epidemiological studies
Probable Human Carcinogen
Limited epidemiological studies and sufficient
animal studies (B1); or inadequate epidemiological
but sufficient animal studies (B2)
Possible Human Carcinogen
Limited animal studies and no human studies
Not Classifiable as to Human Carcinogenicity
Inadequate human and animal studies
Noncarcinogenic in Humans
No evidence of carcinogenicity in adequate human
and animal studies

B

C
D
E

The key judgment to be made in such classifications is whether the
evidence is sufficient to classify a substance as a human carcinogen,
sufficient to classify a substance as a carcinogen in animals but limited
with respect to human carcinogenicity, or insufficient to classify the
substance at all. The EPA provides loose guidelines for the task of
determining if a substance is a human carcinogen with sufficient
evidence, the primary guideline being well-conducted human epidemiological studies. How evidence is to be used to classify a substance as an
animal carcinogen and/or suggestive of human carcinogenicity, and
how various bodies of evidence other than epidemiological data are to
be united to produce a final judgment, are not specified other than to
call for the use of all such evidence.
The goal of assessment guidelines is to provide a framework which
draws on the expertise of many disciplines, makes use of diverse bodies
of information pertinent to judging carcinogenicity, provides clear rules
for reaching and/or justifying decisions needed to classify substances,
and allows at least a limited role for expert judgment. While these goals
are agreed to be desirable, the existing guidelines for conducting
carcinogen hazard identifications leave significant conceptual and
methodological gaps in providing a philosophically rigorous framework
for assessing evidence and justifying conclusions.
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The position of agencies and scientific experts typically has been
that it is not possible to develop a completely formal method for
assessing the carcinogenicity of a substance. This seems a correct view,
recognizing that much scientific work, especially mandated science (in
which the time available for rigorous exploration of unresolved scientific
issues often is shortened), ultimately must rest on expert judgment.
Still, there is a need for better guidance on how these judgments are to
be formed and, of equal importance in a regulatory setting, justified or
warranted. The recent rulings on Daubert principles (legal guidelines as
to how "good" and "junk" science are to be distinguished in courts)
makes the need for guidance more pressing, since the lack of a
framework for assessing the quality of scientific judgments leaves the
interpretation of Daubert principles open to excessive subjectivity and
to the possibility that the interpretations will be driven more by
strategic positions than by valid epistemic arguments.
Guidelines should help risk analysts understand the rational basis
for their judgments of carcinogenicity; understand the rational basis for
alternative judgments; isolate the reasons for differences in judgment
between individual analysts; and aid decision-makers in understanding
these features in the final analysis. They should also help the analyst
relate personal reasoning to norms of rationality established either by
the larger scientific community, by scholars in rationality, or by the
policy community making use of the analysis. In this paper, we present
a quasi-formal framework for reaching judgments of carcinogenicity in
a manner that draws clear attention to the process of reasoning towards
those judgments. The framework has features in common with logictree analysis in the sense that the process of reasoning proceeds from
lower-order judgments to higher-order claims. However, the
framework is built with explicit recognition that judgments formed at
nodes of a logic tree ultimately involve a process of expert reflection
and debate over principles of choice. The goal is not to lessen the role of
expert judgments, but rather to provide a procedure through which the
rationality of those judgments may be understood by experts and
presented to decision-makers.
The framework uses recent advances in carcinogenicity theory and
in the philosophies of rationality and epistemology to structure debates
8 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 307 [Fall 1997]

on claims made on the carcinogenicity of substances in humans. With
respect to the use of carcinogenicity theory to structure at least the
general flow of scientific judgments and the bodies of evidence useful
in reaching those judgments, the framework is similar to those
developed recently by other researchers and by the EPA. The key
difference lies in the way in which the present framework focuses
attention explicitly onto the philosophical principles of rationality
underlying judgments, principles rarely discussed in scientific debates.
Taken together, these organizing theories and philosophies provide
a framework for analyzing or deconstructing scientific judgments in a
way that is tractable to both the scientific and policy communities. The
resulting framework should be viewed as an intermediate ground
between these two communities, focused on issues of both science and
science policy. It "deconstructs" the scientific rationale leading to
expert judgments of carcinogenicity, allowing the regulatory, policy
and legal communities to understand the particular rationale used in
specific assignments of carcinogenicity.

Principles of Rational Analysis
We begin by asking: What is the nature of rationality and how
might this be formalized into a framework useful for judging
carcinogenicity?A central assumption here is that hazard identification
should be rational if it is to satisfy demands for scientific accuracy and
precision, for philosophical soundness, and for the legal requirement
that decisions follow a "hard look" at a problem and not be arbitrary
and capricious. The many schools of thought concerning rationality
2
may be placed usefully into two broad groups:
The Classical School of Rationality. Rationality is considered a
matter of deduction of the carcinogenicity of a compound from
foundational bodies of data reduced to observation statements. This
deduction follows the rules of logic, is capable of being "programmed"
in the form of well-defined algorithms that are valid universally and is
completely open to review.
The Dialogical School of Rationality. Rationality is considered the
result of a process of reasoned debate. Debate concerns not only the
strength of logical deductions, but also the meanings of terms such as
2

Harold Brown, Rationality (1988).
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"evidence", "reasoning", "truth", etc. As summarized by Bernstein, 3
central to this new understanding is a dialogical model of
rationality that stresses the practical, communal, character of
this rationality in which there is choice, deliberation,
interpretation, judicious weighing and application of
universal criteria, and even rational disagreement about
which criteria are relevant and most important.
The dialogical school recognizes that scientific debates follow what
Toulmin 4 calls "warrants", meaning lines of reasoning that are not
conclusive (i.e. not fully logical) but are accepted as sufficiently
"reasonable" to justify at least tentative carcinogenicity claims.
We have chosen deliberately to develop here the framework for
analysis based on the dialogical position. We believe it best corresponds
to the modern conception of science within philosophy. One example
of the application of this philosophy to problems of risk analysis is
Schrader-Frechette's conception of scientific proceduralism 5 in which
the rationality of science owes as much to the process of scientific
debate as it does to the application of formal rules for deduction.
This debate allows flexibility needed to encompass different
opinions about the quality and relevance of data, the quality of theories,
and the nature of proof in science, while also ensuring that judgments
made by individual scientists or groups are not arbitrary and capricious.
Expert judgments remain an essential part of dialogical rationality, but
they are constrained by the framework for dialogue demonstrating the
reasonableness of those judgments in light of specific bodies of evidence
and explicit rules of reason. Central to both schools of rationality is an
insistence on stating the reasons for claims and demonstrating that
those reasons are sufficient to justify the claim.
What are the issues around which this dialogue must be
constructed if a hazard identification is to be considered rational?
Rational dialogues for hazard identification may be structured around
the following principles, taken in part from the writings of Bunge 6 on
rationality and philosophy of science:
3
4

Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (1983).
Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument Analysis (1958).
5
Kristen S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality (1991).
6
Mario Bunge, Seven Desiderata for Rationality, in Rationality: The Critical
View (J.Agassi & I. Jarvie eds. 1987).
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(1) Foundationalism. The quality of observational claims
("observation statements" in the language of logical positivism) for all
data used in reaching a judgment should be assessed and shown to be
of sufficient quality to justify their use as a foundation in further
deductions. This is one example of what Bunge refers to as the
epistemological principle in rationality. Satisfying this principle requires
consideration of the degree to which the data used in a hazard
identification result from studies that are of sound scientific and
statistical design, allowing them to form the basis for reliable
observation statements and further inference.
(2) Deducibility. Complex judgments should be shown to follow
deductively from prior, and simpler, judgments to the degree possible.
Bunge refers to this as the logical principle in rationality. Satisfying this
principle requires consideration of the degree to which a complex
judgment that a substance is (or is not) a carcinogen follows reasonably
from simpler judgments rooted more firmly in the primary data (such
as the judgment that the substance causes mutation).
(3) Completeness. All bodies of data pertinent to a carcinogenicity
judgment should be considered, with all implications of those data.
The goal is to confront the full, and potentially contradictory, body of
evidence, rather than only assembling evidence in support of a particular
judgment. The goal also is to determine the implications of missing
evidence judged a priori to be essential in fully warranting a claim.
(4) Ontological Rigor. All bodies of evidence and their potential
implications should be developed from a review of the best available
scientific theories of carcinogenesis and the role of specific bodies of
data within those theories. Bunge refers to this as the ontological
principle in rationality.
(5) Conceptual Clarity. The meanings of all terms used in a
judgment should be clear and conform to current scientific useage.
Satisfying this principle requires consideration of the meaning of terms
such as "carcinogen", "mutagen", "promotion", etc. The goal is to
ensure that disagreements between experts are not arising simply over
linguistic differences rather than in differences in ontology.

(6) Methodological Rigor. Any framework of analysis should
provide some methodological structure which guides the process of
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making judgments. A failing of existing guidelines for judging
carcinogenicity is that they call for the use of all pertinent bodies of
data and expert judgments without providing a methodology by which
these goals are to be met.
(7) Orientation Towards Goals. The analysis should address all
questions whose answers are thought to be valuable by the analyst. In
the case of carcinogen hazard identification, the questions considered in
the present framework include: Can it be said that the substance is a
carcinogen? Can it be said that the substance is not a carcinogen? In
what sense is the substance a carcinogen? Under what conditions is it a
carcinogen? Under what conditions is it not a carcinogen? What is the
epistemic status (i.e. degree of evidential support) for any of these
claims? Bunge refers to this as the valuational principle.
(8) Practicality. The analysis should produce answers to the
questions above in a reasonable length of time and given a reasonable
allocation of resources. It would be irrational if the analysis took so long
as to result in "paralysis by analysis", since one of the central goals here
is to provide information useful to policy makers.
(9) Sufficiency of Reason. All judgments of carcinogenicity should
be shown to follow reasonably from the available data and the lines of
reason by which those data are used to draw conclusions. This
assignment of "sufficiency of reason" should include consideration of
the quality of data and the quality of any additional assumptions (or
background premises) 7 that must be introduced in using the data in
supporting a particular claim. It should also include consideration of the
reliability of basic categories of reasoning from evidence (called
relevance strategies and defined in the next section).
(10) Consistency. Principles of reasoning should be applied
consistently throughout an analysis and between different analyses, or
reasons should be given for any changes. The framework for analysis
should draw attention to any inconsistencies by requiring an explicit
judgment about the degree to which this consistency principle is
satisfied. This consistency might be found in ontological and/or
epistemological positions adopted in the analysis.
7

Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge (1990).
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Basic Definitions
We turn now to the issue of conceptual clarity: What are the basic
terms that must be understood to use the framework of analysis
presented here? Details of definitions may change between analysts,
and the framework does not require any particular formal definition to
be useful. Still, these are the definitions adopted by the authors in
developing the framework and should prove relatively uncontentious.
Claim of Carcinogenicity. One of the claims made as result of the
hazard identification. The separate claims are described in a later
section. For each claim, it may be determined that the substance being
examined has the characteristic (the judgment P); that the substance
does not have the characteristic (the judgment not P); or that the
determination cannot be made based on available evidence
(indeterminate).
Epistemic status. A qualitative assignment (high, medium, low or
no) of the degree to which a claim of carcinogenicity is supported
coherently by available well-founded evidence used in appropriate lines
of reasoning. It includes consideration of the quality of the data, the
degree to which reasoning conforms to rules of logic, and the quality of
background assumptions called for in the lines of reasoning (these
background assumptions usually arise from the set of axioms
underlying theories of carcinogenicity). Epistemic status is a measure of
the strength of the warrant for a claim.
Data item. Any specific measurement or set of measurements of
an objective property of either a substance, the organism exposed to
that substance, or the environment within which that exposure takes
place, and which is useful as a foundation for inferences of
carcinogenicity.
Data category. One of the basic classes of data needed to draw
inferences of carcinogenicity. These classes are introduced as a means
to bring order to a potentially large range of data by collecting data
according to their function within lines of reasoning, as discussed in
more detail below.
Completeness. A qualitative assignment (high, medium, low or no)
of the degree to which data items used in the analysis adequately
represent the full body of data items available in a data category. The
highest assignment of completeness is obtained when all available data
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are used, or when the data used are known to be representative of those
not used. The intent of judging completeness is to ensure that the
analyst does not bias data selection inadvertently or to support preestablished conclusions.
Utility. A qualitative assignment (high, medium, low or no) of the
ability of a study to accurately and precisely measure the data item it
reports. The utility of a data item is a measure of the foundational
qualities of that item. The highest assignment of utility is obtained
when a study follows established protocols, satisfies strong statistical
criteria, and the effect measured is shown to be causally related to
exposure to the substance. Utility is not a measure of the degree to
which the data support any final conclusions on human carcinogenicity,
but rather a judgment that the data can be used to draw conclusions
about the particular aspect of the process leading to carcinogenicity
they originally were developed to address.
Strength of Effect. A summary of the effect observed, such as the
appearance of tumors; a statement of the magnitude of the effect. It is
not a judgment about whether a study displaying that effect is of
sufficient quality; that judgment was made previously based on utility.
Relevance Strategy. A basic category of lines of reasoning by which
data are related to specific claims of carcinogenicity. "Relevance"
implies that the data are useful as premises appearing in one or more
processes of deduction used in warranting a claim, usually in
conjunction with background premises. Options are summarized below.
Background Premises. Additional assumptions that must be
introduced if a given body of data is to be used as a warrant for a
particular claim of carcinogenicity. These usually are found in theories
which give the data meaning and allow them to be used in drawing
inferences about carcinogenicity.
Intellectual Obligation. A qualitative assignment (high, medium,
low or no) of the degree to which a particular category of reasoning
(relevance strategy) must be available and factored into a claim of
carcinogenicity if that claim is to have high epistemic status. Note that
these requirements are not the same. The first is based on the degree to
which the analysts requires that a particular relevance strategy be
available in performing an analysis. The second is based on the degree
8 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 307 [Fall 1997]

to which the analyst must weight the results of this strategy if available.
It is permissible for an analyst to insist that a relevance strategy be
weighted strongly when available, and yet not consider the epistemic
status of a claim weak when that strategy is not available (although
other analysts may insist that this position is incoherent or inconsistent).
Coherence. The degree to which the same conclusion about a
claim of carcinogenicity is reached from different perspectives. These
different perspectives might arise from different data items, different
data categories, different relevance strategies, or different claims of
carcinogenicity. Coherence may be at two levels. The lowest level is
extant coherence in which the conclusions are the same from each of the
existing lines of reasoning for which the necessary data are available. A
more strict criterion of coherence is ideal coherence in which it is shown
not only that conclusions are the same from all existing lines of
reasoning (therefore providing extant coherence), but that these existing
lines of reasoning include all lines deemed necessary a priori in fully
warranting a claim of carcinogenicity.
Context. The complete physical, chemical and biological setting
within which the carcinogenicity of a substance is being judged.
Central to the idea of a context is the belief that a substance may be
carcinogenic in some settings but not necessarily in others. These
settings include factors related to the substance (e.g. dose and doserate), the organism (e.g. sensitivity), and the presence of other
environmental conditions (e.g. concurrent exposures). Claims of
carcinogenicity are judged within a given context. If the context is the
one of interest (i.e. humans), the claims are in the target context. If the
context is not the one of interest, the claims are in an observational
context.
Intracontext Extrapolation. Extrapolation of claims of carcinogenicity from within a context, usually from one level of exposure to
another.
Intercontext Extrapolation. Extrapolation of claims of carcinogenicity from an observationalcontext to a target context.
Extrapolation Premises. The set of assumptions that must be used
in extrapolatingfrom one context to another, described below.
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An Ontology of Carcinogen Classification
We now ask: How might the scientific study of carcinogenicity be
used to provide an ontologically sound framework for selecting
pertinent data and showing its relevance to claims of carcinogenicity?
A large number of mechanistic theories of carcinogenicity exist;, it
seems unreasonable to confine the framework to any particular theory.
In fact, a goal of the framework should be to assess the validity of
competing theories in drawing inferences about the carcinogenicity of a
substance. The framework should be flexible to allow modification as
understanding of carcinogenesis evolves.
Figure 19
The Ontology of Carcinogenesis Adopted in This Framework for Analysis
Exposure

I
Intake

Uptake

Burden

BSDR
Neoplastic
Conversion

I

Neoplastic
Development

8 J. Carl Barrett & Richard W. Wiseman, Cellular and Molecular Mechanisms of
Multistep Carcinogenesis: Relevance to Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 76 Envtl.
Health Persp. 65 (1987); Gary Williams & John Weisburger, Chemical
Carcinogenesis,in Toxicology (1991); and Samuel Morris, Cancer Risk Assessment:
A Quantitative Approach (1990).
9 The upper part of the figure displays the reasoning from exposure to BSDR. The
lower part shows the reasoning from BSDR to a Neoplasm (Adapted in part from Fig.
5-1, Williams & Weisburger, supra).
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Still, some ontological choices must be made about the broad
features of carcinogenesis so as to provide an initial methodological
framework for analysis. The authors have adopted the following
minimal assumptions about carcinogenesis; also see Figure 1.
(1) Cancer results from the action of a substance or its metabolites
on specific targets in the organism, although there may be multiple
targets and multiple mechanisms of action.
(2) Cancer develops in more than one stage (i.e. is a multistage
process). These stages include at least neoplastic conversion and
neoplastic development. The identification of these two stages with
initiation, promotion and progression is not required here, but that
possibility is not excluded by the framework of analysis.
(3) The mechanisms of action may be either genotoxic (operating
directly on the genetic material of cells, such as on DNA) or nongenotoxic (operating on structures other than genetic materials, such as
on gap junctions in intercellular communication).
(4) The action of the substance is related directly (which does not
necessarily mean linearly) to a biologically-significant dose-rate
(BSDR). The BSDR is related to the concentration of the active form
of the substance or its active metabolite(s) at the site of the target.
(5) The BSDR is related to the exposure through pharmacokinetic
properties which are a function of the substance, the organism and the
presence of other environmental conditions (including exposure to
other substances). The pattern of reasoning is from exposure intensity
(e.g. concentration of the substance in the environment), to exposure
(which includes exposure intensity and length of exposure), to intake
(which is a measure of the amount of the substance taken into the
body), to uptake (which is a measure of the amount of the substance
absorbed into the body), to burden (which is a measure of the amount
of the substance in an organ or tissue), and to BSDR (which includes
consideration of the role of metabolic activation or inactivation).
(6) A carcinogen produces transitions between stages of cancer. If
all transitions are produced by a substance, the substance is a complete
carcinogen within the context of exposure. If only a subset are
produced, the substance is a partial carcinogen within the context of
exposure and will elevate the incidence of cancer only if the other
transitions are produced by other causes. If the substance must join
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physically with a second substance to produce the active substance (e.g.
producing a third chemical), the substance is a mixer within the
context of exposure. If the substance doesn't produce transitions, but
causes cellular changes that allow a second substance to cause
transitions, the first substance is a helper.
These six basic assumptions about carcinogenicity lead to a
hierarchy or taxonomy of claims of carcinogenicity. The individual
bodies of data described in the next section act as part of the warrants
for these claims through the relevance strategies discussed in a still later
section. First in the hierarchy is the claim that the substance increases
the incidence of cancer within the context. Next in the hierarchy is the
classification of the substance as a complete carcinogen, a partial
carcinogen, a mixer and/or a helper. Next in the hierarchy is the
specification of the substance into the two stages, either neoplastic
conversion or neoplastic development. Finally, the mechanism of action
may be given as either genotoxic or non-genotoxic.
As the analyst moves from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy,
the details of the mechanism of action become progressively defined.
The conclusions at the lower levels support the claims at the higher
levels by providing rational support through claims to understanding
mechanisms, which is one of the hallmarks of scientific rationality.
They also help to specify the conditions (or context) within which a
substance acts as a carcinogen. It also should be the case that claims at
different levels are coherent, at least if the analyst judges coherence to
be an important measure of epistemic status. For example, the claim
that a substance acts at the stage of neoplastic conversion may be taken
as incoherent with the claim that it acts through a non-genotoxic
mechanism if the analyst believes that neoplastic conversion means
initiation and that initiation is caused by direct action on DNA (an
assumption that is not inherent in the framework developed here but
which is allowed within that framework).
Organizing the Data
We now ask: How might the data be organized so as to show their
role in relevance strategies and ensure that all pertinent bodies of data
are assessed, while not overwhelming the analyst with a potentially
8 Risk- Health, Safety & Environment 307 [Fall 1997]

large and unstructured mass of information?We have chosen to divide
data into six functional categories (i.e. catgeories based on their
functions within lines of reasoning) which will be related later to the
relevance strategies, background premises and/or extrapolation
premises. The bodies of data associated with each are provided here
only as examples. The framework of analysis draws the analyst's
attention to these, but others may be added.
(1) Tumor Response. This includes all bodies of data in which
some characteristic of tumors following exposure is measured directly.
These characteristics are incidence, prevalence, multiplicity, time-toappearance, age-at-appearance, initiation or promotion.
(2) Biophysical Effect. This includes all bodies of data in which a
biological change leading to, but not completely identical with, cancer
is measured. These data include measurements of hyperplasia, DNA
adducts, oncogene activation, interference with intercellular
communication, ability to metastasize, concentration of tumor growth
factor, DNA breakage, chromosomal aberrations, site-specific
mutations, mutagenicity, cellular transformation, relevant alterations in
RNA structure or function, appearance of cancer marker proteins,
alterations in antigens, presence of preneoplastic lesions, alterations of
cellular architecture, alteration of distribution in histological types or
differentiation, cytotoxicity, or hormonal alterations.
(3) Host Characteristics. This includes all bodies of data
concerning the susceptibility of a host to cancer following delivery of a
biologically significant dose-rate. These data include DNA repair rates,
DNA repair specificity, density of repair enzymes, repair kinetics,
activation/inactivation of repair processes, background rates of
transition, presence of a target organ/tissue, or presence of a specific
carcinogenicity mechanism or pathway.
(4) Pharmacokinetic Properties. This includes all bodies of data on
the relationship between exposure and biologically significant dose-rate.
These data include frequency and volume of inhalation, rate of
ingestion, lung morphometry, lung physiology, epithelial integrity,
deposition fractions, absorption fractions, partition coefficients, organ
masses, removal half-times, measures of facilitated transport, first pass
excretion, first pass metabolism, cardiac output, organ perfusion, pore
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sizes, metabolic reaction kinetics, substrate density, renal flow rate,
renal permeability, diffusion coefficient, neutrophilicity, adduct
binding coefficient, intake rates, uptake rates, or organ burdens.
(5) Concurrent Environmental Conditions. This includes all bodies
of data on the environmental conditions present during exposure to the
substance of interest, at least as these data are pertinent to defining the
context of exposure. These data include attachment to particles,
presence of oils during administration, presence of other substances, or
conditions of stress.
(6) Structure-Activity Relationships. This includes all bodies of
data on substances other than the substance of interest, but possessing
similar structural characteristics important to carcinogenesis.
The Relevance Strategies
Now: How can the analyst employ specific bodies of data in
drawing inferences about claims of carcinogenicity, while recognizing
the existence of alternative lines of reasoning? We have chosen to
organize different lines of reasoning into five relevance strategies.
Different analysts might use different relevance strategies, but the
following strategies are most commonly discussed in epistemology,
philosophy of science and risk analysis. Throughout the framework,
analysts are asked both to justify their particular selection of relevance
strategy and to reflect on the strategies they did not select. The goal
ultimately is to confront conclusions drawn from all relevance strategies
and to assess the coherence across them.
(1) Direct Empirical.This line of reasoning uses direct observations
of the effect of interest (such as increasing the incidence of cancer)
within the context and level of exposure of interest in making a claim.
Clearly, only tumor response data may form the foundation for this
line of reasoning. In addition, the tumor response data must be in the
context of interest. If the target context is human, tumor response data
from rats does not constitute direct empirical evidence for the target
context, although it does constitute direct empirical evidence for
carcinogenicity in

the rat observational context. The necessary

background premises for direct empirical evidence are that the data was

produced in a context in which the relationship between exposure and
8 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 307 [Fall 1997]

BSDR, as well as the relationship between BSDR and effect, is identical
to that defining the context in which claims are being made. These
background premises are supported by data from biophysical effects,
pharmacodynamic properties, host characteristics and concurrent
environmental conditions.
(2) Semi-Empirical Extrapolation. This line of reasoning uses
observations of the effect of interest at exposures above those of
interest, but within the same context. A pattern is noted in the
relationship between exposure and effect, and this pattern is "followed"
or "extrapolated" to the level of exposure of interest. The major
background premises are those for the direct empirical strategy, as well
as the premise that the pattern used for extrapolation is either well
established by theory or directly observed in data. Again, only tumor
response data may form the foundation for this line of reasoning,
although the other categories of data may prove useful in supporting
the claim that the pattern is to be expected based on understanding of
the biological mechanism of action (i.e. etiologic theory).
(3) Empirical Correlation. This line of reasoning uses observations
of effects other than tumor production. The reasoning is that
appearance of these effects correlates with appearance of tumors. No
attempt is made to explain why this correlation exists, although a
judgment must be made of the strength and specificity of the
correlation. The pertinent data are primarily biophysical effects (e.g.
mutation) and structure-activity relationships (e.g. the presence of a
bay region), but pharmacokinetic properties may also be used (e.g.
production of an active metabolite). The background premises involve a
demonstration that the conditions in which the correlation was
measured previously (and which controls the strength and specificity)
also are found in the context for which claims of carcinogenicity are
being made in the analysis. Support for the background premises may
be found in data on biophysical effects, pharmacodynamic properties,
host characteristics, concurrent environmental conditions and structureactivity relationships.
(4) Theory-Based Inference. This line of reasoning uses
observations of effects other than tumor production. It differs from
empirical correlation in that the analyst uses a mechanistic theory of
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carcinogenicity to explain why observing (or not observing) the nontumor effect justifies the claim that the substance is (or is not) a
carcinogen. For example, observing mutation could be used as a
theory-based warrant for the claim that a substance is a carcinogen if
the analyst accepts (with sufficient proof) the theory that one of the
transitions to cancer may be produced by mutation of genetic material,
and that other transitions will occur with a non-zero probability.
The background premises involve a demonstration that the theory
used in drawing the inference is supported within the context of
exposure. Other premises are that exposure, intake, uptake, burden,
biologically significant burden, and transitions between stages of cancer
all are resulting from the presence of the substance within the context
for which claims are being made. The pertinent data are biophysical
effects, pharmacodynamic properties, host characteristics, concurrent
environmental conditions and structure-activity relationships.
(5) Existential Insight. At times, the analyst may support claims
based on expert judgment. This approach is not irrational so long as it is
believed that experts possess knowledge that cannot be demonstrated
by any particular process of reasoning. It is equivalent to Polanyi's tacit
knowledge. 1 0 To the degree rationality is deemed to require public
disclosure of reasons for claims, this strategy may fail to satisfy criteria
of rationality. The background premises involve establishing that the
expert falls into the group of experts likely to have developed such
knowledge based on pertinent experience.
The Framework for Analysis
Having established the principles and terms on which the
framework for analysis will be constructed: What is the specific form a
methodology might take for assessing the epistemic status of claims of
carcinogenicity?Whatever the form, it should draw attention to each
of the considerations raised earlier, should require specific judgments
related to those considerations, should make it clear how those
judgments play a role in arriving at the final assignment of the
epistemic status of a claim, and should make it clear how that
assignment might differ if other judgments had been made. It should
cause the analyst to provide both scientific and philosophical positions
10

Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (1958).
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necessary to establish the reasons for claims, without necessarily causing
an infinite regress in which continued questioning of reasons to deeper
levels is pushed to extremes that impede the formation of judgments
(and go against the goal of practicality).
Figure 211
The Series of Tasks within This Framework of Epistemic Analysis

Task 1: define contexts
(e g. rats)

Task 2: sort data items into
contexts and data
categories
(WT1; e g. biophysical
effects in rats)

Task 3: assess
foundational quality of
each data item
(WT2; completeness,
utility and strength)

V
Task 6: assess coherence
across relevance strategies
for each claim
(WT3; column
summaries)

Task 5: assign epistemic
status to claims in a
context
(WT3; increases incidence;
classification; stage;
mechanism)

Task 4: assign
intellectual
obligation to relevance
strategies
(WT3-6; DE, SEE, EC,
TBI andEl)

Task 8: assess epistemic
status of extrapolation
premises
(WT4; repeat tasks 2-7
for each premise)

Task 9: assign epistemic
status to claim in target
context for each
extrapolation
from observational
context
(WT5; all claims)

zIIi
Task 7: assess coherence
of claims within a
context
(WT3; overall
summaries)

Final epistemic status
of all claims in the
target context
(WT6; overall summaries)

Task 10: assess coherence
of claims in target
context across
all extrapolations
(WT6; column
summaries)

11 The tasks proceed from defining the contexts; to sorting the data into contexts
and data categories; to assessing the epistemic status of claims within each context; to
extrapolating from observational to target contexts; to assessing the epistemic status of
claims in the target context.
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The methodological framework adopted here is based on a series of
working tables through which the analysis must pass; see Figure 2. The
working tables bring the analyst through each of the judgments that
must be made, organizing these judgments into a final assignment of
the epistemic status of particular claims of carcinogenicity within
specific target contexts. Each claim of carcinogenicity is assessed first
within each separate observational context using only data items
generated from studies satisfying the conditions of that context.
Extrapolation premises then are established for each necessary case of
extrapolation from an observational context to a target context. The
extrapolations then are carried out and an overall assessment made of
the epistemic status of claims of carcinogenicity in the target context.
This section of the paper provides a highly abbreviated example of
the working tables, taken from an earlier feasibility study designed to
test the usefulness of the methodology in judging the carcinogenicity of
formaldehyde. 1 2 The feasibility study used only a very limited set of
data since the intent was to test the methodology rather than to
perform an actual hazard identification for formaldehyde. The example
is provided here only to show what the working tables look like and
how they are used. No conclusions should be drawn concerning the
validity of the specific judgments shown in the tables, or the sufficiency
of those judgments as a basis for regulatory decisions.
The working tables are organized into a series of tasks producing
answers to the following questions; see Figure 2:
Task 1: What are the observational and target contexts to be
considered in the analysis? Working Table 1 (WT 1) requires that the
analyst define the various contexts, giving a clear description of the
conditions of the organism, substance and environment that must be
satisfied if a particular data item is to be considered as having been
generated in a given context. This description is provided in the
heading to each table, with one table for each context. The goal here is
to select a relatively small number of contexts in which summary
12

Douglas J. Crawford-Brown & Kenneth G. Brown, Hazard Identification in

Carcinogen Risk Analysis: An Integrative Approach. Parts I 6 I. (1992). Also
Douglas J. Crawford-Brown, Jeffrey Arnold & Kenneth G. Brown, Hazard

Identification in Carcinogen Risk Analysis: An Integrative App roach. Part II. An
Application of the Methodology: Formaldehyde in Air (1994) (Reports to EPA; may
be obtained from the authors).
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judgments of carcinogenicity may be made (thereby organizing the
data into manageable collections), without losing essential information
about the unique characteristics of individual studies and their contexts.
Working Table 1
Data for the Target Context; Exposure of Humans to
Airborne Formaldehyde at Concentrations Below 2 ppm

Study
Numbera

Data
Category

Description

I

BE

Primary Reference #7 in Table
31 female and 24 male human subjects were grouped into
cohorts exposed to formaldehyde vapor in various
occupations characterized by exposure to formaldehyde in
tobacco smoke and other unspecified routes. Subjects then
were evaluated for antibody reaction (serum IgE or IgG)
and for whether the presence of antibodies correlated with
a history of respiratory and conjunctival symptoms. The
low level exposure for histology technicians was 0.64 ppm;
for pathology residents from 0.2 to 0.64 ppm; and for
medical] residents was unreported. Clinical assessments of
antibody formation were made by ELISA detection and
by skin challenges followed by subjective expert judgment
of the presence of a response.

a
The study number refers to the order of the study within this context. The primary
reference number indexed to Table 1 is provided in the "Description" column.

In the example, the target context is taken as exposure of humans to
airborne formaldehyde at concentrations of less than 2 ppm.
Observational contexts are the target context, as well as exposure of
rats, mice and humans mice to airborne formaldehyde over 2 ppm, as
well as in-vitro exposure of human cell lines and in-vitro exposure of
nonhuman mammalian cell lines to formaldehyde in solution. The
decision to separate human exposures into two concentration categories
(above and below 2 ppm) is based on the desire to draw inferences
about carcinogenicity at low levels, where the inferences might be
different from those drawn at higher levels of exposure. If the goal was
simply to ask whether formaldehyde was a human carcinogen at any
level of exposure, this separation would have been unnecessary and both
human contexts would be put together into a single target context.
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Task 2: What are the data items available in each context and what
do they show directly (i.e. with no further inferences required)? The
goal of this stage of the analysis is to assign each data item a reference
number for tracking, to determine the appropriate data category for
that data item, and to provide a summary observation statement. A
separate description is given for each data item in each study placed
into each context. In the example shown here, which is for the target
context, only a single study (called Study Number 1) is used, with the
data on allergic response being placed into the category of biophysical
effects (BE). There is a single data item in this study.
Working Table 2
Summary Judgments of the Foundational Quality for Data
in WT 1 for the Target Context
Data Category/Item

Description Completness Utility

Tumor Response

No study
available [NSA]

Biophysical Effect

Allergic response
(BE1.1)

Pharmacodynamics

NSA

Host Factors

NSA

Concurrent Environmental Conditions

NSA

Related Substances
Assessment

NSA

HI

HI

Strength
of Effect

ExposureSpecific
a
Effect

NO

WT2.C12
BE.l

a Refers to thc Exhibit Number for the data as described in the text.

Task 3: What is the foundational quality of each data item in each
context? WT 2 summarizes the judgments of the quality of each data
item in each of the six data categories prior to the use of those data in
lines of reasoning. In the example shown here, the working table is for
the target context. It may be noted that the only data item is in the
data category of biophysical effect; that the effect was an allergic
response; and that this data item was assigned a label of BE1.1 for
indexing (biophysical effect; study 1; data item 1 in that study).
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Working Table 313
Summary of the Judgments of Epistemic Status for the Claims of Carcinogenicity
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13 The top table shows judgments for the Target Context. This utilizes only data in the
Target Context as shown in Working Tables 1 and 2. The bottom table is for the Observation
Context of rats and is provided here for contrast with the judgments in the Target Context.
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The first judgment is of the completeness of the data items in each
data category. Here, the assignment of completeness is HI (high) since
this one study of allergic effect was the only study identified in a larger
literature search of allergic effects noted in this context. The assignment
of utility is HI since the study was judged to follow appropriate
protocols and to have a sufficient statistical power to detect the
examined effects. The assignment of strength of effect is NO since no
allergic response was found. Taken together, these three judgments
constitute the foundational quality of this data item.
Task 4: What is the measure of intellectual obligation assigned to
each relevance strategy? All working tables after the second require
that this judgment be made. If the principle of consistency is valued
highly, the measure of intellectual obligation for a specific relevance
strategy should be the same across all working tables and all contexts.
In the example shown above for WT 3, we took the epistemological
position of a strong empiricist, giving high intellectual obligation to
direct empirical reasoning, i.e., the effect of interest must be observed
at the level of exposure of interest if the epistemic status of a
carcinogenicity claim is to be high, regardless of how well established
other lines of reasoning might be. We also assert that expert judgment
will not be weighted heavily (low or LO intellectual obligation to
existential insight) but the other three relevance strategies should be
moderately (medium or ME) weighted in the final assignment of
epistemic claim status. Other legitimate assignments are possible.
Task 5: What is the epistemic status of each claim of
carcinogenicity as warranted by each separate relevance strategy within
each context? Each judgment is shown as a separate cell in WT 3.
There is a separate working table for each observational and target
context. It may be seen in the example WT 3 that the claims of
carcinogenicity correspond to the hierarchy of claims described earlier.
Columns for claims may be added, subtracted or altered as the
ontology provided by scientific theories of carcinogenesis changes and
as the analyst finds it useful to distinguish modes of action.
The judgment of the epistemic status of a claim (shown in one of
the cells of WT 3) based on a particular relevance strategy depends on
the answers to seven questions:
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(1) Which data items identified in WT 1 are appropriatefor use in
that relevance strategy? This was discussed in the earlier section on the
relevance strategies. For example, the relevance strategy of theory-based
inference shown here in WT 3 uses the biophysical effects data on
allergic response.
(2) What is the foundational quality of each of these data items, as
summarized in WT 2 (and as addressed in Task 3)? This foundational
quality is given by the composite of the judgments on completeness
and utility, both of which were judged to be high in the example of
formaldehyde used here. The composite judgment was, therefore, that
the foundational quality is high (HI).
(3) What was observed in this data item? Here, the observation was
that allergic response was not produced following exposure.
(4) What are the background premises needed for use of these
data in this relevance strategy? The analyst must describe the manner
in which background premises, in conjunction with the data items from
(2), support the claim. For this example of theory-based inference, the
background premises are that exposure was present; an intake of
formaldehyde was present; uptake of formaldehyde at the target site
for allergic response was present; a burden of the biologically-active
form of formaldehyde and, hence, a biologically significant dose-rate
was present; that allergic response indicates increased rates of transition
between stages of cancer; and that any remaining transitions would be
caused by background events.
(5) What is the epistemic status of each of these background
premises and of the theory of carcinogenesisfrom which they arose?
To be fully supported, data must demonstrate the validity of each
premise listed in (3) within the context being examined (here it is the
target context). For this example, the background premise suggesting
allergic response produces transitions was judged to have low support.
Other background premises were judged to be well supported.
(6) What is the intellectual obligation assigned to this relevance
strategy? This judgment is shown as medium (ME) in the intellectual
obligation column in the example WT 3.
(7) What is the composite judgment of epistemic status for the
claim of carcinogenicity under each relevance strategy within this
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context? In the example WT 3, the epistemic status for theory-based
inference and the claim that formaldehyde exposure increases the
incidence of cancer is NO, meaning that the available evidence, when
used in this relevance strategy, provide no warrant for the claim. This
judgment might have been reached because the foundational quality of
the data item used was poor (NO); because the epistemic status of
background premises was poor (NO); or because the strength of the
effect was poor (NO). In the example here, the epistemic status was
given as NO because no effect was observed, and even if it had been,
the premise of an etiologic link between allergic response and
carcinogenicity was judged to be poorly established.
The entry of a judgment into this cell relates only to the question of
whether formaldehyde in this context does increase the incidence of
cancer. A separate table is used for the judgment that formaldehyde
does not increase cancer incidence. An assignment of NO in the
example shown cannot be taken as evidence that formaldehyde does
not increase the incidence of cancer. It simply says that there is little or
no warrant for the claim that it does increase cancer incidence based
on this relevance strategy and selected data items.
Another issue raised in making these entries is how to treat the
existence of competing bodies of data and/or competing theories. The
analyst is asked to select and justify one or more of several options for
dealing rationally with competing bases for claims. These are to select
only the data/theory with the highest epistemic status; to combine data
into a single set (a form of meta-analysis); to complete working tables
under each combination of data/theories and then make a composite
judgment across these different sets of working tables; or to provide
weights to each data set and theory and take a weighted average across
these before performing each step in the analysis.
Task 6: What is the composite epistemic status for each claim of
carcinogenicity in each context, taking into account all five relevance
strategies? Here, the analyst is judging the coherence of the warrants
for a particular claim of carcinogenicity across the relevance strategies.
This is shown as the Column Summary judgments in the example WT
3. It is expected that this composite judgment will involve a weighting
of the judgments from the separate relevance strategies in proportion to
8 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 307 [Fall 1997]

their respective intellectual obligations. An alternative approach might
be to use only the relevance strategy with the highest intellectual
obligation. In the example shown here, the composite Column
Summary judgment of epistemic status is NO since the judgment was
NO for all relevance strategies (indicating high coherence).
Task 7: What is the composite epistemic status for each claim of
carcinogenicity in each context, taking into account all claims? Here,
the analyst is judging the coherence of claims across all claims in the
hierarchy (i.e. across all Column Summary judgments). This is shown
as the Overall Summary judgments in the example WT 3. This issue
was discussed previously when describing the heirarchy of
carcinogenicity claims.
Working Table 4

Summary of the Judgments of Epistemic Status for Extrapolation Premises
between the Observational Context of Rats and the Target Context
Relevance
Strategy

Intellectual
Obligation

Exposure
to BSDR
Conversion

BSDR to
Effect
Conversion

Host
Factors

Environmental
Conditions

Direct Empirical

HI

NO

NO

LO

ME

Semi-Empirical

ME

NO

NO

NO

NO

Empirical
Conlation

ME

ME

ME

ME

NO

Theory-based
Inlicrenc

ME

ME

HI

ME

ME

LO

ME

HI

ME

ME

LO

LO

LO

ME

Extrapolation

Existential Insight
Ovcrall
Assessment

Task 8: What is the epistemic status of the extrapolation premises
needed to extrapolate between each observational context and the
target context? These are established by the ontology of carcinogenicity described earlier. Necessary premises are summarized in WT 4:
Extrapolation Premise 1. The relationship between exposure and
BSDR is sufficiently similar in the two contexts that a claim of
carcinogenicity in the observational context may be taken as a claim of
carcinogenicity in the target context, all other factors equal.
Extrapolation Premise 2. The relationship between BSDR and the
effect of interest is sufficiently similar in the two contexts that a claim
of carcinogenicity in the observational context may be taken as a claim
of carcinogenicity in the target context, all other factors equal.
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Extrapolation Premise 3. The host characteristics are sufficiently
similar in the two contexts that a claim of carcinogenicity in the
observational context may be taken as a claim of carcinogenicity in the
target context, all other factors equal.
Extrapolation Premise 4. The environmental conditions (other
than the concentration of the substance of interest) are sufficiently
similar in the two contexts that a claim of carcinogenicity in the
observational context may be taken as a claim of carcinogenicity in the
target context, all other factors equal.
It is necessary to address the seven questions appearing in Task 5 for
each of the four extrapolation premises. This is shown in the example
WT 4 as judgments in the separate cells. The reader should note that
this example working table is for the observational context of rats
exposed to formaldehyde at any concentration.
Task 9: What is the epistemic status of each claim of
carcinogenicity in the target context when this claim is extrapolated
from each observational context? WT 5 calls for a judgment of the
epistemic status of each claim of carcinogenicity in the target context,
but based on extrapolation of the claims in WT 3 for a particular
observational context. For example, the judgments of claims in WT 3
for the context of rats exposed to formaldehyde is combined with the
judgments of the epistemic status of the necessary extrapolation
premises shown in WT 4 to produce the judgments in WT 5.
It may be seen that the epistemic status of all claims is NO under
the direct empirical relevance strategy, since the rat data are not
produced in the target context (violating the meaning of direct
empirical reasoning). It might be argued that, to be consistent, the same
should be true for claims based on semi-empirical extrapolation. WT 5,
however, shows that the analyst has used the rat data to assert that
formaldehyde exposure in humans at 2 ppm or less is likely to produce
genetic changes, with the epistemic status for this claim being medium
(ME). The reason for this choice is that the analyst judged the
mechanism of genetic damage to be independent of context. If a
second analyst disagreed with this premise, the entry into the cell in
WT 5 would be NO.
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Both a Column Summary and an Overall Summary must then be
produced in a manner described in Tasks 6 and 7. A separate version of
WT 5 is completed for each pair of observational and target contexts.
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In each case, the version of WT 4 used in the extrapolation is specific to
that pair of contexts. For the example of formaldehyde used here, five
different versions of WT 5 were generated during the analysis.
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Task 10: 'What is the final epistemic status for each claim of
carcinogenicity in the target context, taking into account all routes of
inference? There are versions of WT 5 for each observational context,
and a version of WT 3 for the target context. Each working table has
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produced a judgment of the epistemic status for each claim of
carcinogenicity in the target context based on warrants from a different
context. The final step is to combine these judgments. This is shown in
the example provided as WT 6. The context numbers refer to those
assigned in the original report. Context 12 is the target context;
Context 5 is rats; Context 6 is mice; Context 11 is humans exposed to
greater than 2 ppm; Context 13 is human cell lines; and Context 14 is
nonhuman mammalian cell lines.
The Overall Summary judgments from the earlier tables (WT 5 for
an observational context and WT 3 for a target context) are entered
into the appropriate row of WT 6. Tasks 6 and 7 are then repeated to
produce composite judgments as a Column Summary and an Overall
Summary. The Overall Summary row then contains the final judgment
of the epistemic status of each carcinogenicity claim for the target
context. It may be seen from WT 6 that the final judgments are:
(1) The epistemic status of the claim that formaldehyde increases
human cancer incidence at 2 ppm or less is LO. This is not to say that
the evidence shows formaldehyde doesn't produce cancer at this
exposure. Such a judgment requires separate working tables focused on
the claim that formaldehyde does not increase the incidence.
(2) The epistemic status of the claims that formaldehyde is a
complete carcinogen, is a partial carcinogen, is a mixer, is a helper, acts
on neoplastic development, and acts by non-genotoxic mechanisms
when humans are exposed at 2 ppm or less is NO.
(3) The epistemic status of the claims that formaldehyde acts on
neoplastic conversion and by a genotoxic mechanism is medium (ME).
It can be seen that the analyst did not consider the claim that
formaldehyde acts on a neoplastic conversion to be incoherent with the
assignment of LO to the epistemic status of the claim that
formaldehyde increases the incidence of cancer, or with the assignments
of NO to the various classifications. This is evident from the fact that
the Column Summary and Overall Summary judgments are identical.
Another analyst might judge that formaldehyde being a genotoxic
agent is further support for the other claims of carcinogenicity,
choosing to increase the epistemic status of one or more claims in the
Overall Summary.
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Discussion
We have provided a framework of working tables and associated
tasks by which carcinogenicity judgments for a substance may be
assessed rationally. Central to it are the principles that rationality
requires explicit consideration of the epistemic status of a claim; that
epistemic status is constructed from a review of available data and lines
of reasoning in which that data plays a role; and that a proper judgment
of epistemic status is formed after reflection on the coherence across
competing scientific and philosophic positions.
This framework provides a tool for structuring discussion or debate,
in, e.g., Science Advisory Board or National Academy of Sciences
committee meetings or in regulatory negotiation. Ideally, individual
analysts would complete working tables in relative isolation, allowing
each to formulate a personal view on the epistemic status of claims.
Individuals then would meet to examine similarities and differences of
judgments. Discourse would focus on reasons for differences, locating
them in the selection of pertinent data bodies, the development of
contexts, judgments of foundational data quality, identification of
background premises needed for use of relevance strategies (in the form
of theories of carcinogenesis), assignment of epistemic status to
premises, assignment of intellectual obligation to relevance strategies,
treatment of coherence in the Column or Overall Summaries, and/or
judgments of the epistemic status of necessary extrapolation premises.
This can identify where and how individual analysts differ and provide
a useful format for decision-making and conflict resolution.
An equally important role for the framework is to identify sources
of uncertainty for organizing future research. It makes clear why the
epistemic status was assigned a particular value. Research may then
focus on critical points at which weaknesses in the reasoning process
were evident. The framework also clarifies how weaknesses depend on
philosophical positions, such as the assignment of intellectual obligation
and the treatment of coherence. This suggests an important role for
research not only into the etiology of cancer, but into the validity of
philosophical positions that ultimately underlie all judgments of the
rationality of claims within hazard identification.
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